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Turkey has experienced important institutional transformation during the last decades. In 
particular, it has started with liberal policies of early 1980s. Turkey has abandoned the import 
substitution policies after a serious balance of payment crisis. Foreign trade regime has been 
liberalized and export oriented development strategy has been adopted. The main goal has 
been to create a market based economy integrated with world markets. However, this first 
wave of institutional change is far from adequate. On the contrary, inadequate regulatory 
framework at financial sector and widespread corruption as well as bad macroeconomic 
management has led to crises between 1990 and 2001. Thus, the institutional change towards 
regulatory state is triggered with those economic crises. In response to these economic crises 
and the external pressure of global institutions like the IMF, significant legal changes such as 
liberalization in utilities sectors and restructuring of banking sector have been realized and 
some independent regulatory authorities have been set up. The Competition Authority was 
established in 1994 as part of the Custom Union agreement with the European Union (EU). 
The Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency was established in 1999 to improve the 
effectiveness of regulation and supervision and to establish an independent decision-making 
mechanism for the banking sector. The legal infrastructure for the Central Bank’s 
independence was established by amending some articles of the Banking Law in 2001. 
Telecommunications Authority and Energy Market Regulatory Authority were set up in 2001 
prior to liberalization of communications and electricity generation and distribution markets. 
The implicit logic of all this so-called structural reforms is to create and enhance the market 
based economy and the associated rationalization of public management in line with it. The 
Central Bank’s independence from the political authorities that is perceived as a vital 
guarantee for prevention of irresponsible monetary policies, liberalization of electricity, gas, 
telecommunications and aviation sectors, privatization of large state monopolies at those 
utilities sector including Turk Telekom, building independent regulatory authorities, …etc are 
among some of the important changes of this new institutional era. In this paper, I try to 
discuss the questions why these significant institutional changes have occurred and what the 
promises realized and shortfalls of these authorities during the last decade in Turkey by 
conducting a literature survey. I think that after the introduction of second wave of 
institutional change, macroeconomic stability has substantially improved by creating a new 
institutional environment based on market mechanism and state as a regulator. Institutional 
change has been seemed to be successful for avoiding crisis in spite of the global financial 
crisis. The robustness of banking sector due to the restructuring is crucial for avoiding crises. 
1 
 On the other hand, new institutional environment is far from perfect. There are some serious 
risks and deficits. First, legal ambiguities between regulatory agencies may create power 
struggles and inefficiency. Secondly, having independent regularity authorities and new laws 
alone does not mean a guarantee for expected effective results. Finally, political class in 
Turkey is a myopic behaviour and their understanding has very serious short comings. 
Especially, I argue that the political commitment to support those independent administrative 
authorities by political elites is limited. I believe that the role of independent administrative 
authorities and the reorganization of Turkish traditional state structure towards regulatory 
state will continue to be debated in near future. 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Turkey was faced with four major crises since the early 1990s; in 1994, 1999, 2000-2001and 
finally the global crisis of 2008-2009.  The GDP has shrunk 5.4 percent in 1994, 2.6 percent 
in 1999, 9.2 percent in 2001, and 4.7 percent in 2008-2009
1. As Öniş and Şenses (2007: 270) 
have argued,  the combination of fiscal instability and premature capital account liberalization 
in the absence of an adequate regulatory framework have been largely responsible for the 
eruption of successive economic crises in 1994, 2000 and 2001. In each of the first three 
cases, the Turkish government has gone to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for help. In 
return, IMF demanded restructuring of domestic economy and pressed for institutional 
reform. In fact, the sources of this institutional change were a mixture of domestic and 
external factors that emerged during and in the immediate aftermath of the 2000-2001 
economic crises. I argue that the institutional transformation experienced in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s has contributed to economic prosperity during last decade while there are serious 
challenges. 
 
In response to these economic crises and the external pressure of global institutions like the 
IMF, significant legal changes such as liberalization in utilities sectors and restructuring of 
banking sector have been realized and some independent regulatory authorities have been set 
up. The Competition Authority was established in 1994 as part of the Custom Union 
agreement with the European Union (EU). The Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency 
was established in 1999 to improve the effectiveness of regulation and supervision and to 
establish an independent decision-making mechanism for the banking sector. The legal 
infrastructure for the Central Bank’s independence was established by amending some articles 
of the Banking Law in 2001 (Eroğlu and Eroğlu, 2010: 130). Telecommunications Authority 
and Energy Market Regulatory Authority were set up in 2001 prior to liberalization of 
communications and electricity generation and distribution markets.  
 
The institutional transformation in Turkey was not confined to establishing independent 
regulatory authorities and included other developments such as various legal changes like 
significant reduction in corporate tax rate. However, the scope of this study is limited with the 
independent regulatory authorities since they represented by far the most important and wide 
ranging developments in this sphere during the two decades under study. Following the 
market liberalization that took off in early 1980s, substantial steps were taken to create a 
regulatory state similar to those in EU and USA during these two decades. Therefore, it is 
                                                 
1 The rates of change in GDP for first three crises are calculated by using GDP values at 1987 prices. The rate of 
change in GDP for the last crisis is calculated by using GDP values at 1998 prices. All data are obtained from 
TUİK website. 
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 important to understand this transformation and assess its effects on economic growth 
performance of the country.  
 
The aim of this paper is to underline the significance of the institutional change in Turkey as 
well as its limitations in Turkey. There are several studies that may be relevant. However, 
some of them are discussing the issue partially and the other for mainly focusing on solely 
restructuring of banking sector. I think that we need a broader perspective. It seems that 
policy makers do not appreciate the issue adequately. The regulatory state, independent 
regulatory authorities and its implications are quite new subjects for most of policy makers in 
Turkey. This is because there are several studies on the issue that I have found. I believe that 
this paper will provide a good starting point to the issue for interested one. 
 
The organization of the paper is as follows: In Section 2, after this introduction, a brief 
literature survey will be conducted on institutions and the regulatory state. This is followed in 
Section 3 by a discussion of the evolution of institutional environment that we have today. It 
will be focused on establishment of independent regulatory authorities. In Section 4, the 
positive effects of institutional change in early 2000s are discussed. Furthermore, the potential 
problems with new existing institutional environment have been considered.  Finally, last 
section includes a brief summary and conclusions. 
 
II.  Institutions, Growth and the Regulatory State  
 
What are the institutions? 
 
According to North (1990: 3) institutions are the rules of the game in a society simply
2. In 
other words, they are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. 
Institutions may be both formal and informal. For instance, a particular law is a formal 
institution and conventions and codes of behavior are informal institutions. North suggests 
that institutions reduce the uncertainty by providing a structure to everyday life. In this paper, 
when I use the term institution, it will imply formal written codes. 
 
Institutions are mostly determined at national level. Indeed, they are main policy variables 
that policy makers can design at national level. For example, intellectual property rights law, 
competition law, tax law, other financial regulations may provide right and wrong incentives 
for economic actors depending on design. 
 
There is a two way relationship between organizations and institutions. For example, the 
structure and effectiveness of competition authority, a national planning organization, a 
national science agency…etc. is influenced by institutions mainly. In some cases, they owed 
their existence to these institutions directly. Likewise, some organizations may affect and/or 
create new institutions with their decisions or secondary legislation. For example, independent 
regulatory authorities are set up regarding to national legislation or laws. At the same time, 
via secondary legislation, decisions and setting standard they create new rules and constraints 
for economic actors.  
 
                                                 
2 There is also a wider definition suggested by Grief for institutions such that institutions are a system of rules, 
beliefs and organizations (Helpman, 2004: 115). In other words, organizations are institutions as well. This 
definition of course is different from North’s. However, I prefer to follow North’s approach. 
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 Rodrik and Subramanian (2003: 32) suggest a classification of institutions with respect to 
their functions. In this framework, certain institutions protecting property rights and ensuring 
contacts are market creating institutions since without them there will be probably no market 
at al. The other types are market regulating, market stabilizing and market legitimizing 
institutions. Market regulating institutions are those to regulate market failure sourced from 
externalities, economies of scale and scope and imperfect information. They give regulatory 
authorities in telecommunications, transport and financial services as examples
3. Market 
stabilizing institutions are those providing low inflation, minimizing macroeconomic 
volatility and avoiding financial crises such as central banks, exchange rate regimes and fiscal 
rules. Finally, market legitimizing institutions are those providing social protection and 
insurance, involving redistribution and managing conflict such as pension systems and 
unemployment insurance schemas. Also Rodrik (2000) mentions about market and non-
market institutions in spite of accepting the difficulty of clear separation between them 
completely. Moreover, he argues that democracy is a meta-institution for building good 
institutions since it absorbs local knowledge in institution building process in a better way 
(Rodrik, 2000, 19). 
 
Institutions and economic growth 
 
Neoclassical economic growth model or Solow-Swan model implies that per capita income in 
poor countries grows faster than per capita income in rich countries such that all economies 
converge the same per capita income (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004: 1). In reality, this is not 
the case. Some countries experience very low growth rates and per capita income for long 
periods of time. Hence, there are some rich countries, middle-income countries and extremely 
poor countries. The accumulation of physical and human capital explains only small part of 
the variation across countries in income per capita and its rate of growth. Solow residual or 
the change in the total factor productivity
4 or technological change explains the remaining 
part. Indeed, differences in total factor productivity levels cause more than half of the cross-
country variation in income per capita (Helpman, 2004: 111). Furthermore, technological and 
institutional factors also affect the rate of accumulation of these capital inputs as well as 
knowledge that affects technological progress.  
 
Institutional approach for economic growth suggests that economic and political institutions 
affect the incentives to accumulate and to innovate significantly. According to Helpman 
(2004: 139); 
 
“Countries that start with similar endowments can follow different 
developmental paths as a result of differences in institutional structures, 
because institutions affect the incentives to innovate and to develop new 
technologies, the incentives to re-organize production and distribution in 
order to exploit new opportunities, and the incentives to accumulate 
physical and human capital. For these reasons institutions are more 
fundamental determinants of economic growth than R&D or capital 
accumulation, human or physical.” 
 
                                                 
3 Therefore, Rodrik and Subramanian admit organizations as institutions that is different from North’s 
understanding.. 
4 Total factor productivity is a concept that measures change in productivity by taking account of more than one 
factor of production. The determinants of total factor productivity change can be decomposed into components 
such that change in the total factor productivity can be explained by technical efficiency change, technical 
change and scale efficiency change (Coelli et al, 1998). 
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 For instance, without the protection of property rights, accumulation of capital, land and 
investment in R&D can’t take place. Therefore, institutions are vital for economic 
development. 
 
Also Helpman (2004: 112-113) mentions some other interesting arguments. Institutional 
design embodies a fundamental conflict between the goal of controlling disorder and the goal 
of limiting the power of the executive since governments can also themselves infringe on 
private property. It implies a tradeoff for control of business and there are four common 
strategies of such control. These are private orderings, private ligation, regulation and state 
ownership. In this tradeoff, institutions and politics are inseparable. Helpman (2004: 113) 
argues that “Together they determine the ability of countries to accumulate, to innovate, to 
adopt new technologies, and to reorganize in the face of technological change. And they 
shape the economic policies that either promote or hinder growth.” 
 
There are several economic models trying to understand economic growth
5 (Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 2004: 16-21). Most of them are following a mathematical approach like Solow. 
However, Institutionalist school of growth follows a non-mathematical path. Therefore, 
supporting their arguments with econometric analysis is rather difficult
6. Furthermore, 
institutions cannot be copied wholesale from one society to others and they require a long 
time span to develop (Baumal et al, 2007: 40). This is also another obstacle for empirical 
testing of the hypothesis. However, the difficulty of empirical testing should not diminish the 
importance of Institutionalist arguments. 
 
Nevertheless, I have accessed several empirical studies on institutions and growth. Rodrik 
(1997) analyzes determinants of growth differences among East Asian countries by 
employing econometric methods. In particular, he is interested in whether accumulation of 
capital is important in growth rather than total factor productivity change or not. Interestingly, 
he found that institutional factors are largely explaining the growth differences among the 
countries. According to Hall and Jones (1999) the differences in physical capital and 
educational attainment can only partially explain the variation in output per worker. Instead 
they claim that the disparity in productivity of labor can be explained by differences in social 
infrastructure or differences in institutions and government policies. Also social infrastructure 
is endogenous to the system and determined historically by location. 
 
Rodrik et al (2002: 4) have conducted a study to explain why some societies have managed to 
accumulate and innovate more rapidly than others by suggested answers, namely geography, 
integration, and economic institutions. While the question seems simple, there are some 
serious challenges
7. For instance, there is a need to find good instruments for integration and 
institutions. Rodrik et al use a composite indicator for institutions to capture the property 
rights and the rule of law depending on earlier studies of other researchers. They use the ratio 
of trade to GDP for integration variable. The dependent variable is GDP per capita on a PPP 
basis for 1995. They have compiled two data sets with 80 and 140 countries. In short, they 
                                                 
5 For example, nowadays endogenous growth model is popular. Unlike the Solow-Swan model, endogenous 
growth theory assumes technology is endogenous. In other words, technological change is determined in the 
model not given from exogenously. Knowledge accumulation and innovation is the main themes. Hence, it 
provides a model that economists can analyze economic growth and it’s relationships with incentives, 
organizations and institutions that shape knowledge accumulation (Aghion and Howitt, 1999: 4)  
6 The interested reader may see Aron (2000) for a review of problems at econometric studies on growth and 
institutions. 
7 Rodrik et al (2002) also try to address the problem that there is also endogenity problem with dependent and 
independent variables. 
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 have found that institutions have both positive and significant effect on income. Indeed, their 
evidence supports that institutions are important determinants of both accumulation and 
productivity so that institutions have a larger impact on physical accumulation quantitatively 
than on human capital accumulation or productivity.  
 
Glaeser et al (2004) argue that instead of political institutions causing economic growth, 
growth and human capital accumulation cause institutional improvement. In other words, 
according to Glaeser et al, the causality between institutions and growth is reverse. They 
employ an OLS and instrumental variable techniques by using previous studies data sets 
described above. Their evidence suggests that human capital is more important than 
institutions and most indicators of institutional quality are unsuitable conceptually. 
 
What is regulation? 
 
There are various meanings of regulation depending on different countries and time (Jordana 
and Levi-Faur, 2004: 3-4). For the narrow meaning, regulation is defined as specific form of 
governance involving a set of authoritative rules accompanied by an administrative agency in 
order to monitor and to enforce compliance. For broader meaning, regulation is defined as 
governance in a general sense involving the aggregate efforts by state agencies to steer the 
economy. For broadest meaning, regulation is defined as all mechanisms of social control. 
Prior to 1980s, regulation has narrow meaning at USA and broader meaning outside USA. 
After 1980s, regulation implies its narrow meaning in general. 
 
What is regulatory state? 
 
The regulation approach with independent regulatory authorities has been more popular since 
late 1980s.  This trend sparks usage of term of regulatory state among some researchers and 
policy makers. Jordana and Levi-Faur (2004: 8) have summarized the debate of the existence 
of regulatory state and if exists then what the regulatory state is. From this discussion, it is 
understood that the term regulatory state implies modern states that are giving more emphasis 
on the use of authority, rules and standard-setting rather than public ownership, public 
subsidies and direct provision of public goods.   
 
Majone (1997: 12-13) has made a description of emerging regulatory state. According to him, 
the main function of regulatory state is correcting market failures rather than redistribution 
and macroeconomic stabilization. The instrument to achieve its goals is rule making rather 
than taxing and spending. The main area of conflict is to review and control of rule making 
rather than budget allocation process. The characteristic organizations are parliamentary 
committees, independent authorities, commissions and tribunals. For the prevailing form of 
state, they are parliament, ministerial departments, nationalized firms and welfare services. 
Key actors in the economy are single issue movements, regulators, experts and judges rather 
than political parties, civil servants and corporate groups. The politic style is rule-bound and 
legalistic rather than discretionary and political culture is pluralistic rather than corporatist. 
Finally, political accountability is indirect rather than direct.   
 
Where, When, why? 
 
According to neoclassical economics, social welfare is maximized under perfect competitive 
markets in the long run and optimum resource allocation is achieved. This point is called 
Pareto optimum or no one is better off without making another individual worse off. In other 
words, equilibrium prices in the market lead to efficient use of resources in the long run. On 
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 the other hand, depending on the market structure there are some cases such that social 
welfare may not be maximized. These cases are called as market failure. The reasons for 
market failure may be various such as huge fixed and sunk costs that lead to imperfectly 
competitive markets, network externalities, asymmetric information and public goods.  
 
There have been different approaches to deal with market failure. Those approaches have 
been changing depending on the time and country. For instance, in the United States, a system 
has evolved based on market regulations by independent boards
8. In the case of European 
countries, those sectors have been left to public monopolies until 1980s (Melody, 1997). The 
rise of the neoliberal agenda associating with crisis in late 1970s in the capitalist world has 
caused to change in this approach. The neoliberal critics have focused on state ownership and 
constructing monopolies. Then the Thatcher government in the United Kingdom (UK) has 
made economic reforms in line with neoliberal critics. In other words, privatization of state 
monopolies and the liberalization of infrastructure sectors started in the  UK in early 1980s.  
 
The reasons for privatization and liberalization are various. Leibenstein (2000) suggests that 
there exists inefficiency called ‘X’ in the firm since the management can have other 
objectives apart from profit maximization such as maximization of organization or budget. To 
eliminate this inefficiency is an argument in favor of privatization. In this context, Vogelsang 
(2002: 8) suggests that the reason for privatization in UK was the failure of previous public 
enterprise reforms. Also, the major reason which allows such a significant shift for 
competitive market structure is the technical progress (Crew and Kleindorfer, 2002: 7). 
Technical progress has caused a decrease in scale and scope economies in the utilities sector. 
Then opening these markets to competition has provided great opportunities for static and 
dynamic efficiency gains.  
 
Despite the technical progress mentioned above, fixed and sunk costs have been still 
important parts of total costs in utilities sector
9.  Then if the former state monopolies in utility 
sectors are privatized then they will become private monopolies not competitive firms. Some 
kind of state intervention is necessary to obtain Pareto efficient outcomes. The solution is the 
re-regulation with independent regulatory authorities by following the USA example
10. The 
regulation with independent administrative authorities approach has been adopted by other 
countries. In other words, liberalization and privatization in utilities sector has started mainly 
in the UK based on the USA example. Then this trend has gradually extended to most of 
countries in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
 
How does it diffuse to the developing world? 
 
There may be various explanations for rapid adoption of liberalization, privatization and 
regulation by independent regulatory authorities by developing countries. In the case of a 
particular sector, according to Saunders et al (1994) these events, coupled with the widespread 
globalization and increased information content of economic activity, led developing 
countries from the mid-1980s on to consider a range of options for reforming the 
telecommunications sector with the aim of helping overcome long-standing constraints on 
development. Also he noted that by 1990, some forty developing countries had completed, 
                                                 
8 In order to obtain comprehensive information, please look at Brock (2002) 
9 According to Melody (1997), 55 percent of total costs are fixed costs for a typical telecommunications firm in 
fixed telephony market. 
10 The USA has 50 states that all follow their own regulatory policies. These experiments provide precious 
knowledge and learning opportunities for interested economists and policy makers. In fact, economists and 
policy makers in the EU have designed their regulatory policies based on this knowledge (Vogelsang, 2002: 8). 
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 were embarked on, or were actively preparing major reforms of the telecommunications 
sector.  
 
In addition, once regulatory state approach has been adopted by core developed countries, and 
then the Breton-Woods organizations, the IMF and the World Bank (WB), have also adopted 
it. When developing countries apply to the IMF, then IMF’s financial help is conditioned to 
implementation of reform package in line with privatization, liberalization and regulation of 
Structural Adjustment Programs.  
 
III.  New Institutional Transformation in Turkey 
 
Turkey has experienced important institutional transformation during the last decades. In 
particular, it has started with liberal policies in the early 1980s. Turkey has abandoned the 
import substitution policies after a serious balance of payment crisis. Foreign trade regime has 
been liberalized and export oriented development strategy has been adopted. The main goal 
has been to create a market based economy integrated with world markets. To support this 
transformation there has been considerable structural change in Turkish economy since the 
early 1980s. However, a more visible shift has been occurred due to economic crises of 1990s 
and 2000.  
 
In Turkey, crises between 1990 and 2001 are mainly caused by inadequate regulatory 
framework at financial sector and widespread corruption as well as bad macroeconomic 
management (Beris and Gurkan, 2001: 5). In fact, the institutional change towards regulatory 
state is triggered with the economic crises in 1990s and 2001 particularly. Also they have 
altered the power balance in the country in favor of regulatory state. The crisis of 1994 and 
2000 are actually banking sector crisis (Baum et al, 2010: 2711). The signs of inadequacy of 
regulatory environment were clear as early as 1982. According to Baum et al (2010: 2711) 
substantial number of brokerage houses had collapsed due to fierce competition and weak 
regulatory enforcement in Turkey.  
 
In general, the financial deregulation and capital account liberalization without a proper 
regulatory framework has caused to fragility of financial sector and economy. This fragility 
has coincided with highly corrupted and poisonous political structure in Turkey. The political 
environment in the country poisoned with nepotism and corruption which may be called even 
crony capitalism. The implication of this environment for banking sector was a high degree of 
politicization. According to Bakır and Öniş (2010: 82), “Banking became such an integral 
part of politics that it has been at the centre of the establishment and collapse of governments 
in Turkey … As a result of politicization, the state banks had largely become instruments for 
channeling deposits into political rent distribution.”  
 
From financial perspective, the high degree of politicization of state banks naturally implies 
inefficient allocation of financial resources. For instance, the state banks have been abused to 
make to provide loans at lower than market interest rate for political purposes. The benefiters 
have been corporations and individuals with linkages of government as well as farmers before 
election periods. The so called ‘duty losses’ have reached unbelievable levels. For example, 
the amount of ‘duty losses’ of the two largest state banks increased from 3 percent of GNP in 
1993 to about 12 percent of GNP in 2000 (Bakır and Öniş, 2010: 82). There is also another 
issue relating to state banks and their relative weight in the banking sector. Traditionally, state 
banks have dominated the Turkish banking sector. In general, state banks are inefficient with 
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 respect to private-sector counterparts, however, the share of state banks on total bank assets 
has fallen from 46.4 percent in 1994 to 31.2 percent in 2007 (Baum et al, 2010: 2712-2718)
11.  
 
On the other hand, private banks have also been faced with distorted incentives. In order to 
maximize profits, they prefer to finance government debt rather than lending credits to 
business firms since thanks to bad macroeconomic management and high amount of losses of 
state owned enterprises there is a high government budget deficit that means a very high real 
rate of return on government debt. According to the Turkish Government in 1999 “Public 
sector debt-including the so-called duty losses of state banks and the net asset position of the 
central bank- is projected to increase from 44 percent of GNP at end-1998 to 58 percent of 
GNP at end-1999.” (Treasury, 1999: 4
th article). Furthermore, many private banks owned by a 
family industrial conglomerate provide cheap loans to other firms in the family. To sum up, 
all these factors have contributed to inefficient financial sector. Hence, this inefficient 
financial sector couldn’t support economic growth by financing productive investments. 
Besides, the rent seeking coalition between politicians, bureaucrats and businessman becomes 
a great obstacle to the emergence of the regulatory state (Bakir and Öniş, 2010: 84). 
 
The crisis of 2001 has diminished the power of domestic rent seeking coalition. In other 
words, due to the crisis a new domestic balance of power has occurred in favor of institutional 
transformation. In fact, the framework of structural reforms has been ready well before the 
2001 crisis. The coalition government under the Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit (the 57
th 
government) has started the Stabilization Program initially as well as it has enacted legislation 
in order to restructure the banking sector and social security system. The incentives for 
reforms have been sourced from international developments and their commitment for reform 
was not strong. (Berkis and Gurkan, 2001: 7). The most decisive factors are external: the IMF, 
WB and EU. During the 57
th government period, EU has recognized Turkey as a candidate 
country and Turkey has signed a new Stand-by Arrangement with the IMF.   
 
In the process of EU membership, Turkey has to comply with EU laws and regulations. There 
are two main conditions, namely the Copenhagen Criteria and the European Monetary Union 
Criteria. In this framework, it is required from Turkey that there should be a functioning 
market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces in the 
EU. In particular, they mean prohibition of direct public sector financing by the central bank, 
prohibition of privileged access of the public sector to financial institutions, independence of 
the central bank and liberalization of capital movements. Therefore the adoption of EU’s 
Acquis Communitaire means for Turkey a substantial structural transformation hand in hand 
with significant institutional transformation. Harrison et al (1997: 868-869) argue that the 
Customs Union with the EU would create difficulties for inefficient state-owned enterprises 
due to increase in competitive pressures on them and they give Spain as an example for 
diminishing role of state in domestic economy after accession. Furthermore, they suggest 
reducing the role of state with respect to subsidies and ownership of production for Turkey. 
Indeed, Turkish Government (57
th government) has also used the argument as a reason for 
economic reforms that higher growth rates must be sustained over time in order to close the 




Likewise, the Stabilization Program has included a reorganization of the social security 
system, agriculture, and banking sector as well as the privatization of some public enterprises 
in order to reverse the unsustainable public debt dynamic (Treasury, 1999: 4the article). The 
                                                 
11 For an analysis on efficiency of Turkish banking industry, one may see Isik and Hassan (2002). 
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 targets have been to reduce both inflation and real interest rate. In this framework, 
privatization has been seen as an immediate source of substantial financial resource to reduce 
the public debt (Treasury, 1999: 23th and 48th articles). However, there is also an expectation 
of economic efficiency improvement via privatization. The telecommunications sector and 
electricity sector are selected sectors for privatization and liberalization. Furthermore, since 
these sectors have high fixed and sunk costs, some regulatory intervention is necessary to 
prevent private monopolies. According to the Letter of intention sent to IMF, the government 
has engaged banking sector reforms (1999: 52th article). Especially, the government admits 
state banks’ role on public deficit vaguely and it implies privatization of them ultimately 
(1999: 58
th article).With this stabilization program and promises, substantial amount of credit 
has been supplied to Turkey by the IMF. 
 
On the other hand, the political commitment to so called structural reforms has not been very 
much. There has been a resistance of some cabinet members to structural changes particularly 
for privatization of state banks (Beris and Gurkan, 2001: 11). In fact, the planned reforms 
would undermine the interests of rent-seeking coalition. After the liquidity squeeze in 
financial markets and the dispute between the Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit and the President 
Ahmet Necded Sezer, an economic crisis has occurred and the Stabilization Program has 
collapsed.  
 
This crisis has also diminished the public confidence on the political class in power to solve 
economic problems and Kemal Derviş, the Vice-President of the World Bank at that time, has 
been invited to Turkey as an economic savior. According to Beris and Gurkan (2001: 13), he 
has been invited “…due to the apparent backing by the American Administration and the 
influential international institutions to this appointment”. A new coalition in favor of 
regulatory state and structural reforms has forged. The elements have been both domestic and 
international. For example, TUSIAD had supported  Kemal Dervis and according to Beris and 
Gurkan (2001: 13-14) “Meanwhile, multilateral financial institutions and the United States 
Treasury made it absolutely clear that Turkey needed to undertake serious structural changes 
to receive further loans”. 
 
A new Stand-by Agreement was signed with IMF in 2002 in order to be implemented 
between 2002 and 2004 period. When one compares the Letter of Intent dated 1999 and the 
new one dated 2002, he will see that the latter is more clear and consistent though it has been 
built on previous reforms inherited in the Letter of Intent dated 1999. The primary two goals 
have been defined as to reduce the chronic and persistent inflation and to overcome the 
macroeconomic instability which has constrained economic growth (Treasury, 2002: 1th 
article). The ultimate goal is to prevent future crises and obtaining sustained noninflationary 
growth. Again, the reforms are justified by the goal of EU membership (Treasury, 2002: 6
th 
article). The suggested policies are tight fiscal policy, inflation targeting under a floating 
exchange rate regime, completion of banking sector restructuring and enhancing the role of 




The implementation of the reforms was not a straightforward task. There have been important 
resistances from various sources. For example, even a government member of that time, 
namely Enis Oksuz as the Minister of Transportation, has opposed to privatization of Turk 
Telekom. Naturally, this has created a dispute between Kemal Dervis and Enis Oksuz. The 
external actors IMF and WB were decisive to solve this dispute in favor of Kemal Dervis. The 
IMF Executive Board has postponed the release of the second part of the agreed loan and after 
that the WB has postponed to release $1.7 billion loan. In the end, government has reached a 
10 
 compromise
12 and the IMF and WB have released the loans and Enis Oksuz was forced to 
resign (Beris and Gurkan, 2001: 15-16).  
 
The implicit logic of all this so-called structural reforms is to create and enhance the market 
based economy and the associated rationalization of public management in line with it. The 
actual roots of crises in Turkey as described briefly above previous rent seeking behaviors of 
economic and political actors. The results have been severe persistent inflation and 
unsustainable amount of public debt. In fact, public sector deficits have been financed by the 
inflation tax (Rodrik, 1990: 2). The neoclassical prescription suggested by external actors is to 
create a new institutional environment based on market mechanism and state as a regulator. 
For instance, the structural reforms have included abandonment of price supports and cheap 
credits to agricultural sector which were the prime source of ‘duty losses’ and privatization of 
state enterprises that were another major source of public sector deficit. Besides, the 
independence of central bank means in practice the prevention of financing ‘duty losses’ 
accumulated at state banks by printing money that means high inflation. Finally, the suggested 
privatization of state banks is the ultimate panacea to limit the political actors’ unwanted 
previous behaviors.  
 
Actually, the costs of banking crisis in Turkey were enormous and the results of the crises 
were devastating for the whole economy. According to Bakir and Öniş (2010: 92) the 
financial costs of the crisis in 2001 had been $ 47.2 billion and this cost was equal to 32 
percent of GDP in 2001. This cost includes injection of $ 23 billion to banks for 
recapitalization in order to eliminate ‘duty losses’ of about $ 27 billion. The political cost was 
also enormous for the political class in power at the crisis. After the 2002 election, according 
to Bakır and Öniş (2010: 89) “Nine out of ten political parties of the previous parliament were 
pushed out of the legislature by the electorate, whilst for the first time in forty years there was 
only one opposition party in the new parliament.” The winning party, the Justice and 
Development Party, has implemented the reform program developed by the pro-regulation 
coalition. 
 
The immediate responses to the crisis are also massive amendments in existing legal texts or 
enactment of new laws such as the Law on Intellectual Property Rights. Those changes have 
defined new rules for economic actors. The Central Bank’s independence from the political 
authorities that is perceived as a vital guarantee for prevention of irresponsible monetary 
policies, liberalization of electricity, gas, telecommunications and aviation sectors, 
privatization of large state monopolies at those utilities sector including Turk Telekom, 
building independent regulatory authorities, …etc are among some of the important changes 
of this new institutional era.  
 
The independent regulatory authorities are organizations that are new for Turkish 
administrative tradition. Nevertheless, they have started to play an important role in the 
Turkish economy. They are also creator of new rules and regulations via creating secondary 
legislations, setting industry standards and by discretionary decisions on disputes. Below, 
some of them are discussed more comprehensively. 
  
Capital Markets Board of Turkey was established in 1981 in order to provide effective 
regulatory framework for developing capital markets. It might be  called a forerunner of 
independent regulatory authorities. Then the Higher Board of Radio Television and 
                                                 
12 Compromise seems to have involved the appointments of four of the seven Telecom Executive Board 
members by Enis Oksuz, two by Kemal Dervis and one by Bulent Ecevit. 
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 Competition Authority were established in 1994 as independent regulatory authorities. Those 
are the first independent regulatory authorities. Today there are mainly nine independent 
regulatory authorities in Turkey: 
  Capital Markets Board of Turkey (CMB), 
  Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTSC), 
  Competition Authority (CA), 
  Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA), 
  Information and Communications Technology Authority (ICTA), 
  Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA), 
  The Turkish Sugar Authority (SA), 
  Tobacco and Alcohol Market Regulatory Authority (TAMRA), 
  Public Procurement Agency (PPA). 
 
However, we are not going to focus on RTSC
13, SA
14 and TAMRA
15, which are not very 
important for our goals in this paper. The remaining organizations are briefly discussed   
below: 
  
Capital Markets Board of Turkey (CMB) 
 
The CMB was established in 1981 by Capital Market Law No. 2499. This law provides the 
legal framework for the establishment of an official capital market. The task of the CMB is to 
establish capital markets and provision of regulatory framework in order to protect the rights 




When CMB was established in 1981, the status of it regarding the Turkish administration 
system was an entity “related” to the Ministry of Finance. Therefore, since many of its actions 
were dependent on approval of Ministry of Finance, it couldn’t be said that it was a 
completely independent authority similar to one in Europe or USA. However, with two 
amendments of Capital Market Law No. 2499 that were enacted in 1992 and 1999 it has 
become more independent
17. Current status is that it is “affiliated” with a Ministry of State 
within the Prime Ministry.  
 
Competition Authority (CA) 
                                                 
13 RTSC was established in 1994 to regulate the broadcasting market following liberalization. Prior to 1994, 
there had been a state monopoly in radio and television broadcasting in Turkey. The responsibilities of RTSC are 
to allocate frequencies of wireless spectrum to the broadcasting companies, to regulate the competition in the 
market and to control the content broadcast. 
http://www.rtuk.org.tr/sayfalar/IcerikGoster.aspx?icerik_id=80775e05-caec-4a48-bac5-39fd6375da3b 
14 SA was established and started its operations in 2001 by the Sugar Law No. 4634. The aim of the Sugar Law 
is to satisfy domestic sugar demand by domestic production and when necessary to regulate the sugar industry 
for exportation. Clearly, this task is unusual. In fact, the existence of SA is peculiar to Turkey. 
http://rega.basbakanlik.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://rega.basbakanlik.gov.tr/eskiler/2001/04/20010419.htm&m
ain=http://rega.basbakanlik.gov.tr/eskiler/2001/04/20010419.htm 
15 TAMRA was established in 2002 by the Law No. 4733 in order to regulate the tobacco, tobacco products, and 
alcoholic beverages markets. TAMRA has also responsible for developing and implementing policies to reduce 




17 In particular, one should understand independence as administrative and financial independence. However, 
independence issue has been explicitly stated in laws for other independent regulatory authorities. 
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Turkish Competition Law No. 4054 was enacted in 1994 and the CA was established to 
enforce Turkish Competition Law. The goal of the CA is to facilitate and to protect 
competition in markets. While the CA was established in 1994, the members of Competition 
Board were not appointed until 1997. 
 
The Competition Board has seven members who are appointed for six years by the Council of 
Ministers
18. According to Turkish Competition Law, the CA has an administrative and 
financial autonomy, it is “related” with the Ministry of Industry and Trade, and it is 
independent in fulfilling its duties. In fact it is explicitly stated in the Law that “No organ, 
authority and person may give commands and orders to influence the final decision of the 
Authority.”
 19  
 
Turkey and the EU created a customs union in 1996. In order to achieve this, it was required 
that Turkey must implement the competition law and policies of the EU effectively. In this 
framework, the enactment of the Turkish Competition Law should be seen as a fulfillment of 
that requirement and so the establishment of the CA in particular.   
 
The Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA):   
 
Within the efforts of comprehensive restructuring of the Turkish banking industry, Law of 
Banking No. 4389 was enacted in 1999. The BRSA was also established in 1999 to regulate 
the industry. However, provision of independence has been achieved with some legal 
amendments in the Law of Banking. The BRSA has administrative and financial autonomy
20. 
Actually, Turkey has carried out the promises on a standby agreement in 1999 with the IMF. 
Interestingly, however, in 2003 government forced the head of BRSA to resign. Besides, a 
new law
21 enacted in 2001 that amended Law of Banking contained a stipulation terminating 
the terms of the existing members of BRSA. The experience of BRSA is illuminating to 
understand what independence means in Turkey.  
 
Currently the BRSA has seven members who are appointed for six years by the Council of 
Ministers. The Chairman and Vice Chairman are appointed from the Board members by the 
Council of Ministers directly. 
 
Information and Communications Technology Authority (ICTA) 
 
The liberalization in Turkish telecommunications industry started partially in April 1998 with 
the granting of two GSM 900 licenses (given via the concession agreements) to Turkcell and 
Telsim. The establishment of ICTA to regulate the Turkish telecommunication industry 
followed an official undertaking by the Turkish government to privatize its state-owned 
monopoly telecommunications operator and liberalize its telecommunications market as part 
of a credit agreement with the WB in 2000. Previously, the Ministry of Transportation and 
partly by Türk Telekomünikasyon A.Ş., the state owned monopoly operator, were responsible 
to regulate the industry.  
 
                                                 
18 http://www.rekabet.gov.tr/index.php?Sayfa=sayfaicerik&icId=165 
19 Article 20. http://www.rekabet.gov.tr/index.php?Sayfa=sayfaicerik&icId=165 
20 Article 82 of the Law of Banking No. 5411. 




 Law No. 4502 dated January 27, 2000
22, which boosted the structural reform from monopoly 
towards a liberalized industry, set forth the date of liberalization for fixed line telephone 
services as 31.12.2003
23. That Law, amending the Wireless Law
24 and Telegraph and 
Telephone Law
25, which were the two basic telecommunications laws in Turkey, constituted 
the baseline not only for opening telecommunications infrastructure and services to 
competition, but also for regulating the industry, e.g. by means of interconnection and 
roaming obligations, pricing rules, dispute resolution processes. To fulfill these duties, a 
regulatory body called “Telecommunications Authority” (TA) was established in 2000. The 
Law No. 5809 or Electronic Communications Law
26 amended the Wireless Law in 2009 so 
that “Telecommunications Authority” term has changed to “Information Communications 
Technology Authority”. 
 
According to Electronic Communications Law, ICTA has administrative and financial 
autonomy. According to the article 67 of Electronic Communications Law, “The Authority is 
independent in fulfilling its duties. No organ, authority and person may give commands and 
orders to influence the final decision of the Authority.” The Information and Communications 
Technology Board has seven members who are appointed by the Council of Ministers. 
 
The Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA): 
 
Similar to the telecommunications sector, the IMF has conditioned the liberalization of 
electricity and natural gas sectors (Treasury, 1999: 48
th article). The obligation naturally 
consists of the establishment of independent regulatory authorities for respective markets. 
Although the Electricity Market Regulation Authority was created by the Electricity Market 
Law No. 4628 in February 2001, a joint regulator, namely EMRA, was established for both 
electricity and gas markets by the Law No. 4646. The Board of EMRA has seven members 
who are appointed by the Council of Ministers. 
 
Public Procurement Agency (PPA) 
 
PPA was established by the Public Procurement Law No. 4734 in 2002
27. The main duty of 
PPA is to design and to develop the principles and procedure for public procurement process. 
Public Procurement Board has ten members who were appointed for five years by the Council 
of Ministers. PPA also enjoys financial and administrative autonomy as well as independence.  
 
The public procurement policy of EU is effective to adopt such legislation as well as 
establishment of PPA. A public procurement policy should be non discriminatory and 
transparent regarding EU legislation in order to prevent rent seeking behaviors and corruption. 
Although EU does not condition establishment of PPA as an independent regulatory authority, 
Turkey has promised to the IMF to establish PPA. 
                                                 
22 The Law No. 4502, http://www.tk.gov.tr/eng/duzenmaineng2.html. 
23 In 1998 the Turkish government had committed itself, in accordance with the World Trade Organization 
guidelines, to liberalize its fixed-line telephone network and services no later than the end of 2004. Law No. 
4502 has shifted the liberalization timetable to the end of 2003 to accelerate the process (Akdemir et al, 2005: 
152).  
24 The Wireless Law No. 2813, http://www.tk.gov.tr/eng/pdf/5681.pdf. 
25 The Telegraph and Telephone Law No. 406, http://www.tk.gov.tr/eng/pdf/ 406.pdf. 
26 http://www.tk.gov.tr/eng/duzenmaineng2.html. 





IV.  Discussion 
 
The effects of institutional change 
 
Actually, the significant changes in institutional settings have started in 1980s as a 
neoclassical response of crisis of previous import-substitution industrialization regime 
(Senses, 1991: 221-222). As expected, the IMF and the Structural Adjustment Programs have 
been effective in the transformation. According to Senses (1991: 221) the most dramatic 
changes have occurred at financial sector such as major banking reform legislation with new 
accounting and reporting standards
28, a deposit insurance schema and capital requirements, 
putting private banks under supervision of Central Bank via reserve requirements, capital 
ratios, and loan provisions; and the creation of an interbank market. However, the experience 
shows that this first wave of institutional change is not adequate to support stability and 
growth in the long term. Hence, second wave of institutional change after 2001 crisis may be 
seen an extension of the first wave. After the introduction of second wave of institutional 
change, macroeconomic stability has substantially improved.   
 
Until now, institutional change seems to have been successful for avoiding crisis. Although it 
is true that Turkish GDP has contracted 4.7 percent in 2009 due to the global financial crisis, 
the growth rate of GDP in 2010 reached 9 percent. This is a sharp contrast with many 
developed countries. The reforms after 2001 crisis have aims of both avoiding future 
economic crises and achieving sustainable high growth rates. Ismihan et al (2002:14) provides 
empirical evidence based on a study over the period 1963 and 1999 such that macroeconomic 
instability in Turkey has deteriorated growth. Öniş (2004: 12-13) claims that the reasons of 
successful growth performance at following several years after 2001 crisis are tight fiscal 
policy as well as structural reforms like restructuring of banking sectors in particular.  
 
The restructuring of banking sector is crucial for avoiding crises. The improvement is sourced 
from three channels mainly: The capital structure of both state and private banks has been 
strengthened; the share of government securities in total bank assets has declined due to tight 
fiscal and monetary policies and strict sector regulations for liquidity and foreign exchange 
risks (Bakir and Öniş, 2010: 90-91). Angkinand (2009) has conducted a study by analyzing 
the relationship between banking regulation and supervision and the severity of banking crises 
measured in terms of the magnitude of output loss. In the study, a data set of cross-section 
time-series of 47 banking crises episodes in 35 industrial and emerging market economies 
between the 1970s and 2003 is used. In general his study supports that countries with 
comprehensive deposit insurance coverage and strict bank capital adequacy requirements 
experience a smaller output cost of crises. In particular, Angkinand (2009: 255) found that the 
output cost of crises was expected to be higher for countries with deposits concentrated within 
a few large banks or a high proportion of state-owned banks, and lower if supervisors were 
independent from political pressures. Hence, one may say that recent Turkish experience is 
consistent with Angkinand’s results.   
 
In addition, one may expect that the restructuring of banking sector should improve the 
overall efficiency in the banking sector as well. Aysan and Ceyhan (2008: 1593-1601) have 
conducted a study to consider the determinants of bank performance in Turkey by using the 
fixed effects panel data regression analysis. The dependent variables are technical input 
                                                 
28 Interestingly, after the 2001 crisis within restructuring of banking sector especially new accounting standards 
have been admitted. See Alp and Ustundag (2009).  
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 efficiency, Malmquist Total Factor Productivity Change Index and its components of 
efficiency change and technological change. These are estimated by using Data Envelopment 
Analysis. The independent variables are bank capitalization, loan ratio, return on equity, 
number of branches, the foreign-domestic dummy, dummies for the 1994 and 2001 crises and 
dummy for the reform period. The data spans from 1990 to 2006. Their study is divided to sub 
periods: pre-reform and reform period. The reform period is defined as the period of 2001 to 
2006. Although their data contains banks representing more than 50 percent of Turkish 
banking sector, state banks, development banks, investment banks  and banks with 
insufficient data are not included. From our concerns, the results show that reform dummy has 
a positive statistically significant relationship with the efficiency and efficiency change. In 
other words, the results of this study supports that restructuring in banking sector has 
increased the overall efficiency in the sector. 
 
There exists another issue that one may question whether liberalization and privatization of 
state monopolies in utility sectors have contributed to economic growth significantly or not. 
At first, state monopolies in these sectors have been started to privatize, which may contribute 
to public finance positively. Actually, the era after 2000 is distinct from earlier period in the 
sense that there is dramatic increase in privatization efforts especially in utilities sectors in 
Turkey. 
 
The Turkish government has obtained more than $26 billion revenue from privatization over 
the period 2005 and 2008 (Atiyas, 2009: 2). This amount exceeds the total amount obtained 
from previous privatizations by a big margin. Besides, these privatizations are instrumental to 
attract foreign direct investment to Turkey. The Turkish economy has a structural weakness 
with having low savings rate that means savings-investment deficit to be financed with short 
term capital inflows. To sustain this deficit, previous governments have required higher real 
interest rates which were one of the reasons for unsustainable public debt dynamic in the past. 
This strategy has worked until now and there has been unprecedented amount of foreign 
direct investment in Turkey recently. Thus, I can say that privatization revenue and its use of 
attracting foreign direct investment may affect macroeconomic stability positively.  
 
If the liberalization and privatization efforts in utilities contribute the economic growth 
significantly, then they contribute with two main channels. First, there might be technical 
efficiency gains expected from liberalization and privatization at sector level. Since technical 
efficiency change is a component of total factor productivity change, this efficiency gains 
might be reflected in the growth rates. Secondly, the outputs of these utility sectors are 
essential inputs for other sectors. Then expected price reductions, higher quality and new 
products and services attributed to liberalization and possible competition might reduce the 
unit costs of production in other sectors that means increase in allocative efficiency in overall 
economy. Finally in the long term, if the liberalized market is competitive enough and new 
investments take off, then one might expect increase in total factor productivity via technical 
progress embodied in new capital goods. Unfortunately, I have no empirical evidence to 
support or invalidate those possible effects of liberalization and privatization in utilities on 
long term economic growth
29 in Turkey. 
                                                 
29 There are some studies on possible effect of liberalization and privatizing in utility sectors. In case of 
developing countries increase in total factor productivity change is sourced from technical efficieny change 
component, while in the developed countries the source is the technical change component. According to Ros 
(1999), telecommunications privatization and competition are positively correlated with technical efficiency and 
that privatization is positively correlated with network expansion. Ros (1999) has conducted a study on 
analyzing the effects of ownership or competition on the telecommunications industry. He examines the effects 
of privatization and competition on network expansion and technical efficiency by a fixed-effects panel data 
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There are also two important studies that emphasize the importance of institutions for long 
term economic growth in Turkey. Pamuk (2007) argues that low quality of institutions is the 
key reason as well as poor education and macroeconomic instability for Turkey’s failure to 
close the gap with developed countries since 1950. The unique contribution of this study, 
from my point of view, is recognition of the role of institutional change in economic growth 
for analyzing long term growth in Turkey (Pamuk, 2007: 7-9).  
 
The other useful study is made by Altug et al (2008). They examine the sourced of long term 
economic growth for Turkey over the period 1880-2005. In general, Turkish growth 
experience is not a miracle but average success with respect to other developing countries. I 
think that there is an important finding of this paper is the qualitative change in components 
of growth between ISI period (1950-1979) and globalization period (1980-2005). In other 
words, they have found that capital accumulation is the prime source of output growth during 
ISI era and the contribution of total factor productivity change to overall growth rate is very 
low. However, during the globalization era the contribution of total factor productivity change 
to overall growth rate is slightly over 1 percent. Maybe more importantly the source of this 
total factor productivity change is the manufacturing sector. On the other hand, capital 
accumulation is slower in this period.  
 
Altug et al (2008: 414), then, emphasize several puzzles that are important from our purpose. 
Although capital accumulation plays a significantly important role in growth in successful 
East Asian countries, total factor productivity change exceeds 2 percent per annum over 1966 
and 1990. Then the question follows that why change in total factor productivity is so low in 
Turkey. Likewise, Turkey has also low rate of capital accumulation with respect to the East 
Asian countries. Finally, Turkey has also low rate of transition from agriculture to non-
agricultural activities.  
 
They discuss the possible explanations for these puzzles by using existing theories, namely 
the role of institutions, human capital and macro-economic policy making. From the 
institutional perspective, they claim that social infrastructure formed by institutions and 
government policies may discourage to reach higher growth rates. According to them (2008: 
417) “the status quo in Turkey has typically favored the pursuit of privileges from local and 
national governments for the producers rather than the pursuit of productivity improvements 
or competition in international markets”. Also they underlie the use of populist policies 
towards agriculture in particular. They argue that agricultural subsidies are the reason for low 
rate of transition from agriculture to more productive sectors. Clearly, the reasons of crises in 
1990s and 2001 are populist vote maximizing behavior of politicians in agricultural sector and 
its consequences on banking sector and public debt dynamic. However, with the second wave 
of institutional change experienced in early 2000s the former ways of agricultural supports 
have been mostly abandoned and new rules are defined to disrupt possible abuse mechanisms. 
Altug et al (2008: 415) give the credit for strong recovery after 2001 crisis to improvement in 
institutional environment thanks to the IMF and the EU as well as the most private sector 
friendly government in Turkey’s history that is the Justice and Development Party.  
                                                                                                                                                          
model using data from ITU. In that study, the sample data pertained to over 100 countries for the period 1986 – 
1995. The dependent variables were various measures of network expansion and technical efficiency, while the 
independent variables were dummy variables for privatization and competition and additional control variables 
such as prices, investment per line and per capita income. One of the important findings of this study is that 
competition appeared to have a relatively less important role with a statistically significant effect only on main 
lines per employee, while privatization appeared to have a statistically significant impact on all measures of 
network expansion and technical efficiency. 
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From the human capital perspective, Turkey’s education system produces very poor results 
and Altug et al (2008: 419) claim that Turkey has lagged to make pro-market reforms 
targeting human capital with respect to the East Asian countries. Finally, they recognize the 
remarkable recovery at the five years after the 2001 crisis and they define a new era though 
they criticize ‘jobless’ nature of this growth. Moreover, they underlie the fact that high 
inflation with high real interest rates and the increasing public deficit thanks to irresponsible 
loose fiscal policies in the past, have led to underinvestment in education and infrastructure by 
draining available resources. 
 
From all this debate, there is a greater awareness in Turkish researchers about the role of 
institutions and institutional change in the long term economic growth. However, the number 
of existing studies is still very limited. Nevertheless, there is a consensus on existence of an 
institutional change in Turkey starting in 1980 and accelerating in 2001 in a complementary 
manner triggered by a series of economic crises. By the same token, there is a consensus on 
recognition of the superior growth performance after 2001 crisis and the positive role of 
institutional change to achieve this result. However, there is no direct empirical evidence on 
whether institutional change is this cause of this higher and less volatile growth rate or not. In 
addition, we may need more time to see the long term performance of growth in Turkey. 
 
Actually, a new understanding and a new consensus on new rules of game depending on 
market mechanism has emerged in Turkey. The positive state as a planner, direct producer of 
goods and services and the employer of last resort becomes the regularity state
30 (Majone, 
1997: 4). The main characteristics of the regulatory state emerged in Turkey are privatization, 
liberalization and re-regulation. In this framework, the role of state has changed from direct 
intervention to market to a kind of intervention by less burdensome methods. In fact, the 
desire is a leaner and more efficient state. Moreover, a new social class has also been rising in 





The emerging institutional environment is far from perfect to support high long term growth. 
In fact, there are some serious risks and deficits for sustaining long term growth. First of all, 
legal ambiguities between regulatory agencies may create power struggles and inefficiency.  
In other words, existing laws are not well thought. There are vague areas, which create 
uncertainties for independent regulatory authorities and, so they reduce benefits expected 
from those organizations. Burnham (2007: 206) argues that there was a need for a clear re-
affirmation of overall policy at that highest level of government. For instance, the CA makes 
ex-post regulations, while sector specific regulatory authority, ICTA, is specialized at ex-ante 
regulations. From an integrated perspective, they have a complementarily relationship in 
function. However, existing laws give both administrations a duty to enforce competition ex-
post. This ill-definition of administrative boundaries has sparked conflicting views and 
disputes among them (Ardıyok and Oguz, 2010: 6-9), (Atiyas and Dogan, 2007: 504). 
Burnham (2007: 206) suggests enhancing greater cooperation and information sharing 
between the two major regulatory agencies. 
 
                                                 
30 Well, one may dispute whether Turkey was a Keynesian welfare state in the past or not. Most probably, this 
proposition is much more suitable for the evolution of European economies. Nevertheless, Turkish economy has 
shown statist characteristics until recently. Thus,  that proposition is also suitable for Turkey to some extent.  
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 Secondly, having independent regularity authorities and new laws does not mean a guarantee 
for expected effective results. The main advantage of the independent regulatory authority 
model is the expertise, specialization to narrow topics and flexibility in decision making as a 
requirement of rulemaking process (Majone, 1997: 17). For a proper functioning, there should 
be highly skilled employees at those organizations with necessary knowledge. Moreover, 
interest groups may affect the decisions of independent regulatory authorities, literally called 
regulatory capture. In addition to these, there may be divergent views between the Ministry 
and related independent regulatory authority. This is frequent in Turkey (Cetin and Oguz, 
2007: 1767-1768). Finally, the appointments to the Boards of independent regulatory 
authorities are made by the Council of Ministers.  
 
At Anglo-Saxon tradition of regulation, founding a commission is a way to diminish the 
partisan effect on decisions. Usually, some members are chosen from different interest groups 
such as consumer associations and/or firm associations representing industry. Moreover, only 
a small number of members are chosen at one time, because it is aimed to diminish the 
possible dominance of any political group in power. In addition to these, once the 
appointment is realized, they are not forced to resign except under unusual circumstances. In 
Turkey, however, all members of the Board are often nominated by the relevant Ministry. 
Moreover, existing member can be nominated by the Ministry again. There is no limit for the 
number of membership. There is one case such that all members of the Board have been 
relieved from duty by changing law. Besides, the Ministry has still considerable power on the 
utility company. This may create conflict of interests between the Ministry and regulatory 
administration. Essentially, the aim of delegation of regulation to an independent agency and 
privatization is to eliminate such possible conflict of interests. 
 
Finally, there seems to be resistance among political class in Turkey. The best example 
exposing this is the liberalization and privatization issue. The expected benefits from 
liberalization come from productivity dividends sourced from elimination of monopolies. The 
difference between monopoly and perfect competition is well known. However, experience 
shows that political class in Turkey needs a catch up about it. Atiyas (2009: 6-7) informs us 
that the law, which would enable privatization of Turk Telekom in 1990s, has been cancelled 
by the Constitutional Court because there was no regulatory framework to be implemented 
after privatization. Clearly, privatization of network monopoly without proper regulation 
leads to negative welfare consequences in the long run. However, the government was 
focused on only the amount of revenue generated by privatization. Atiyas (2009:17) argues 
that to maximize expected privatization revenue government has delayed the privatization of 
Turk Telekom.  
 
In general, governments in Turkey seem interested only in revenue terms not the productivity 
increase at long run. Atiyas (2009: 19-22) provides more dramatic example to how current 
government’ motives are for privatization from electricity sector: A law passed in 2005 
permits the vertical integration between electricity distribution and retail sales firms. His 
comment on this change is illuminating: “…was indicating either that the development of a 
competitive industry was not a main concern or that the Ministry of Energy did not really 
understand the necessary conditions for such a development take place.” According to 
Erdogdu (2009: 1493) “The whole privatization process appears to aim providing additional 
revenues to Treasury without paying attention to the crucial underlying economic logic.” The 
hidden motive is to make more attractive for potential investors to maximize privatization 
19 
 revenue by granting monopoly rents
31. Therefore, the government is either underestimating 
the allocative inefficiency created by monopolies at private hands or ignoring at all. In fact, 
according to Majone (1997: 18) “ … politicians have few incentives to develop policies whose 
success, if at all, will come after the next election”. The problem is sourced from lack of 
commitment by elected government to deal with policies requiring continuity in long term, 
while there is a regular election cycle that is the main concern for the current government. 
Delegating policy making powers to independent administrations such as independent central 
bank is a solution to this problem. In short, government sees privatization as panacea and it is 
only interested in privatization revenue obtained in the short term or until the next Election 
Day. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
Institutionalism argues that economic and political institutions affect the incentives to 
accumulate and to innovate so that they are the main determinants of long term growth rate. 
Institutions are simply the rules of the game in a society so that they constrain human action. 
On the other hand, there are only several empirical studies on institutions and growth. This 
area is quite new. 
 
There is a newly emerged concept -regulatory state. It is a state giving more emphasis on the 
use of authority, rules and standard-setting rather than public ownership, public subsidies and 
direct provision of public goods. The rise of the neoliberal agenda associating with crisis in 
late 1970s in the capitalist world has caused this change. Regulation may be defined as 
specific form of governance involving a set of authoritative rules accompanied by an 
administrative agency in order to monitor and to enforce compliance.  
 
Turkey has experienced important institutional transformation during the last decades. In 
particular, it has started with liberal policies in early 1980s. Turkey has abandoned the import 
substitution policies after a serious balance of payments crisis. Foreign trade regime has been 
liberalized and export oriented development strategy has been adopted. The main goal has 
been to create a market based economy integrated with world markets.  
 
However, this first wave of institutional change is far from adequate. On the contrary, 
inadequate regulatory framework at financial sector and widespread corruption as well as bad 
macroeconomic management has led to crises between 1990 and 2001. Thus, the institutional 
change towards regulatory state is triggered with those economic crises. The crises have 
altered the power balance in the country in favor of regulatory state by diminishing the power 
of domestic rent seeking coalition. During the process, the most decisive factors are external: 
the IMF, WB and EU.  
 
The implicit logic of all this so-called structural reforms is to create and enhance the market 
based economy and the associated rationalization of public management in line with it. The 
Central Bank’s independence from the political authorities that is perceived as a vital 
guarantee for prevention of irresponsible monetary policies, liberalization of electricity, gas, 
telecommunications and aviation sectors, privatization of large state monopolies at those 
                                                 
31 A similar case has occurred during privatization of Turk Telekom in 2005. The government has tried to 
privatize Turk Telekom as a whole. However, the CA has conditioned to the government to separate cable 
network infrastructure from Turk Telekom. At the same time, the CA has required to set up distinct firm for 
internet access business at retail level. The existing cable network has been a real infrastructure alternative for 
Turk Telekom’s classical network. On the other hand, it has not been privatized yet. 
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 utilities sector including Turk Telekom, building independent regulatory authorities, …etc are 
among some of the important changes of this new institutional era.  
 
After the introduction of second wave of institutional change, macroeconomic stability has 
substantially improved by creating a new institutional environment based on market 
mechanism and state as a regulator.  Institutional change seemed to have been successful for 
avoiding crisis in spite of the global financial crisis. The robustness of banking sector due to 
the restructuring is crucial for avoiding crises. There is a belief that institutional change is 
very important to achieve high growth rate with less volatility, there is no any direct empirical 
evidence to prove it. Also, more time is needed to see the long term performance of growth in 
Turkey. Nevertheless, the role of institutions and institutional change in the long term 
economic growth has started to be discussed by Turkish academia. 
 
New institutional environment is far from perfect. First, legal ambiguities between regulatory 
agencies may create power struggles and inefficiency. Secondly, having independent 
regularity authorities and new laws alone does not mean a guarantee for expected effective 
results. Finally, political class in Turkey is characterized by a myopic behavior and their 
understanding has very serious shortcomings. I believe that the role of institutions for 
economic growth and the reorganization of Turkish traditional state structure towards 
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